Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship
1958

Testing for Analytic Ability in the Law School Admission Test
Monroe H. Freedman
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Monroe H. Freedman, Testing for Analytic Ability in the Law School Admission Test, 11 J. Legal Educ. 24
(1958)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION

[VOL.

11

TESTING FOR ANALYTIC ABILITY IN.THE LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST*
MONROE H. FREEDMAN t

I

3

INTRODUCTION

HE Law School Admission Test, in conjunction with college grades,
has, for many years, provided a significant prediction of performance
in law school. We are, however, at present conducting a study of a
section of the Test known as "Principles and Cases" to determine in
what ways it might be improved. Specifically, we have considered
whether the question forms that are currently being used in this section
provide the best possible test of a student's ability to cope with the
precise kinds of intellectual problems involved in the study of law.

II
THE PROCESS OF LEGAL ANALYSIS

Our initial problem is to determine in what distinctive way a student
must be able to think in order to be successful in law school. The answer is suggested by a passage in The Nature of the Judicial Process,
in which Justice Cardozo discusses the intellectual functions of the
judge: 1
[Some judges seldom get beyond] the work of deciding cases in accordance
with precedents that plainly fit them . . . a process of search, comparison, and little more. . . . Their notion of their duty is to match
the colors of the case at hand against the colors of many sample cases spread
out upon their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies the applicable
rule. But, of course, no system of living law can be evolved by such a
process, and no judge of a high court, worthy of his office, views the function
of his place so narrowly. . . . It is when the colors do not match
when there is no decisive precedent that the serious business of the
judge begins.
* This paper was originally prepared as a preliminary report on the current program to consider modification of the present question forms and the addition of new
ones. Dora Damrin, Elisabeth Kimball, and John Winterbottom, of the Educational
Testing Service staff, have made valuable contributions.
t Assistant Professor of Law, George Washington University. The writer over
the past few years has contributed about half the questions now In use in the
Principles and Cases section of the Test.
1 B. N. CARnozo, TE NATnEE OF Tim JUDICIAL PnOCEss 20 (1928).
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Justice Cardozo then goes on to discuss, among other things, the way
in which logical progression, or analogy, and historical development, or
evolution, may be the lines along which "the directive force of a principle may be exerted

.

."

Given a mass of particulars, a congeries of judgments on related topics, the
principle that unifies and rationalizes them has a tendency, and a legitimate
one, to project and extend itself to new cases within the limits of its capacity to unify and rationalize. 3
[However] the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its
logic may be counteracted by the tendency to confine itself within the limits
of its history.t
The lawyer, we infer, must be able to do several things with facility.
First, he must be able to compare a group of stated legal principles with
a particular set of facts. This involves, primarily, the selection and
matching of significant elements in one statement with the significant
elements in another. Second, the lawyer must be able to induce from a
series of cases the legal principle or principles that were controlling.
And, finally, he must deduce the extent to which these principles can
logically be said to control a new set of facts. To analyze a problem
in such a manner is, of course, a very different thing from choosing the
most applicable principle to go with a particular set of facts. Matching
is an important part of this more complex analytical process, but it is
only a preliminary part.
The case method, utilized with various modifications in most law
schools in the United States, is a valuable teaching device for the very
reason that, while imparting a knowledge of substantive law to the
student, it, at the same time, trains him in the analytical techniques that
he will need in practice. The student is usually given a series of complementary and even conflicting cases relating to a particular social or
commercial situation that requires legal regulation. The facts will vary
from case to case, and the legal results will vary with them.
Matching is required in the first instance to segregate and understand
the significant aspects of each case. The student, however, must then
go on to induce from these cases, with their varying facts and legal
results, one or more general legal principles that will unify and rationalize the cases and serve as a guide when a new set of facts is presented.
Often, a case book will provide problem cases-variations on the cases
studied-to be solved by the student after each set of related cases has
been read. Even more often, the instructor in class will suggest problem
2 Id. at 29.

3Id. at 31.
4 Id. at 51.
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cases in order to stimulate this kind of analysis. Here, again, an ability
to match is necessary, but only as a part of the analytical process.
Presumably the law student's examination grades will depend upon
his ability to analyze problems by a combination of matching, induction,
and deduction. This ability should, of course, mature after the candidate
enters law school. The predictive accuracy of the Admission Test, however, must relate directly to the accuracy with which it credits an aptitude
to perform this kind of analysis. We want to know first, therefore, the
extent to which the present question forms test the student's facility in
this respect.

THE LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST
The section of the Test with which we are concerned employs three

forms of question, called Matching, Principle-Case-Reason (P-C-R),
and Case-Principle-Reason (C-P-R).
A.

The Matching Question

The Matching type consists of five legal principles and five, six, or
seven sets of facts. The student is required to select the legal principal
that is "most applicable" to each case. A fairly typical case 5 is the following:
On January 7, 1952, Toby signed a typed document leaving $10,000
to his son and daughter and the residue of his estate to his church.
document was subscribed by his son and two neighbors, as witnesses.
February 1, 1952, Toby and his daughter were in an accident. He
immediately, and she died a few hours later.

each
The
On
died

The correct answer was the principle:
Except to the extent that a similar bequest appears in a valid will drawn at
an earlier date, any bequest is void that is made to a religious or charitable
organization within thirty days of the testator's death.
The principle that attracted almost all of the incorrect answers was:
If a beneficiary of a bequest predeceases the testator, his gift lapses, that is,
it passes not to him, but to the residuary legatee.
5 As appears in the discussion in part 4 infra, this question Is somewhat easier
than most matching questions currently in use and, therefore, It Is not a perfect example. In other respects, it is adequate as an illustration.
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B.

The Principle-Case-Reason Question

The P-C-R type consists of one legal principle followed by three or
four factual situations. For each case, the student is required to answer
whether the principle is "applicable" or "inapplicable," selecting the correct reason out of the four that are suggested after each case. A typical
principle is the following:
Fraud consists of an explicit or implied misrepresentation of past or existing
fact, which is made for the purpose of inducing another to act in reliance
on it in a business transaction; and the defrauded person may recover for
the harm caused by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
One of the cases, with the four statements of reason from which the
one most appropriate choice must be made, is as follows:
Lipmann and his wife bought a large tract of land, planning to use it for
a farm on which to retire. Baracinni, who operated a farm on the adjoining
land sold them the tract in reliance on their promise to use it only for farming.
Shortly thereafter Mrs. Lipmarm died and Lipmann began to build a potato
chip factory on the property.
The above principle is
(A) applicablebecause Baracinni sold the property in reliance on the promise
to use it only for farming.
(B) applicable because the Lipmanns' intention was an existing fact.
(C) inapplicable because Lipmann made no misrepresentation of past or
present fact.6
(D) inapplicable because Lipmann changed his mind for justifiable reasons.
C.

The Case-Principle-Reason Question

The C-P-R type is similar to the P-C-R. A statement of fact is followed by three or four legal principles. The student must decide whether each principle, taken alone, is applicable or inapplicable, selecting the
most appropriate of'four given reasons. The only difference between
the P-C-R and C-P-R questions is that in the former the principle is
more complex and the cases simpler than in the latter. An example of
the C-P-R type is the following:
Kramer, upon finding certain merchandise missing from his store and having for some time been impressed by the inability of Miss King, one of his
employees, to "look him in the eye," called her into his private office after
working hours, closed the door, and accused her of stealing. In spite of
Miss King's tears and her repeated denials of his accusations, Kramer ques6 This is the correct answer.
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tioned her for over an hour. When Miss King started to reach for the
telephone to call her father, he quickly withdrew it from her reach; and
when she stood up to go, Kramer heatedly shoulted, "Sit down, you thief,
I won't let you leave till I'm through with you." A half hour later, Kramer
told the girl she was fired and could leave.
The following week Kramer telephoned McDonald, another businessman who
he heard was contemplating hiring Miss King, to tell him, "I fired her because I think she's a thief." Since McDonald had no regard for Kramer's
opinion, he hired Miss King anyway.
One month later Thomas confessed to the theft.
This case was followed by several principles, each accompanied by
four choices, such as:
A private person has a privilege to make an arrest if the person arrested has
committed a crime or is about to commit one.
The above principle is
(A) applicable because Kramer honestly, though mistakenly, believed that
Miss King had committed a crime.
(B) applicable because Kramer was trying to obtain a confession.
(C) inapplicable because Kramer's grounds for believing Miss King to be
a thief were at best insubstantial.
7
(D) inapplicable because the thief turned out to be Thomas.

IV
THE ADVANTAGES

AND DISADVANTAGES

OF

THE PRESENT FORMS
In addition to the important fact that questions based on the present
forms have helped to predict future law school performance with a
significant degree of accuracy, these forms have yielded several practical advantages. Only relatively simple instructions need be given; the
time allotted to each question can be relatively short; the student can
demonstrate his ability irrespective of any knowledge of substantive law;
and an "item" (a case in the P-C-R, a principle in the C-P-R, or a case
in the matching question) that produces unreliable results can be eliminated without affecting the remainder of items in the question. These
forms, however, provide questions that do not probe fully the reasoning
facility necessary in the study of law.
The matching questions are exactly what the name signifies. In the
example given above, for instance, the following factual elements are
found in the case: (1) a testator signed a will; (2) the will was typewritten; (3) the beneficiaries were (a) his son, (b) his daughter, and
7 This is the correct answer.
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(c) his church; (4) the will was witnessed by his son and two neighbors;
(5) the testator died twenty-five days after signing the will; (6) a beneficiary died a few hours after the testator. The candidate had only
to determine which principle had one or more significant elements that
matched those stated above, and no elements conflicting with them. The
correct answer, relating to the invalidity of a bequest to a religious organization, has elements matching (3) (c) and (5). The candidates who
were misled by the principle relating to the prior death of a beneficiary,
correctly matched the fact that a beneficiary died, but failed to appreciate the fact that she died after the testator.
This question proved on pretesting to be somewhat too easy. Of 300
candidates, 196 answered correctly. The segregation of candidates,
however, in terms of groupings from the top fifth to the bottom fifth,
correlated well with the candidates' rankings on the "criterion" or control test. The mean score of those choosing the correct principle was
well above average, while the ranking of those choosing the lapse principle (sixty-eight candidates) was below average.
Although this kind of question is a reasonable test of the candidate's
ability to isolate the relevant elements of several statements and relate them to each other, there is little if any test in the matching question of his ability to reason inductively or deductively. Perhaps matching is all that is necessary; if a student cannot match the significant elements in cases and principles, he certainly cannot begin to carry analysis
further.
However, there were a substantial number of candidates in each division, from the poorest fifth of the group to the best, who had the correct answer: 30 candidates in the lowest one-fifth, 34 in the next, and
37, 46 and 49 respectively in the next higher divisions. A similar progression, although somewhat more pronounced, is produced by the more
difficult questions. It is certainly possible, therefore, if not likely, that
some greater degree of refinement could be obtained in the group as
a whole by a broader test of analytic ability.
The Principle-Case-Reason and Case-Principle-Reason questions
seem, at first glance, to provide such a test. Here, a general legal principle is stated, and the student apparently must deduce the effect of this
principle in a particular case. Unfortunately, however, such a seemingly inconsequential matter as the use of the words "applicable" and "inapplicable" has severely limited the potential of these questions.
First, "applicable" is an ambiguous word in this context. In the
P-C-R illustration given above, for example, although the correct answer was (C), the principle certainly would be "applicable" in the sense
that it indicates that no fraud occurred. This kind of ambiguity has
forced us to discard many items that otherwise appeared to be superior.
11 Journal of Legal Ed. No.1-3
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More
M
important, however, is the fact that the use of "applicable" and
"inapplicable" tends to reduce the testing scope of these questions to that
of simple matching. Instead of asking the student, "What result would
you have in this case under this principle?" and "Why?," we are asking
him, "Under these facts, have all the requirements set forth in the principle been complied with?" and then, "Is requirement (a) present?,"
"Is requirement (b) absent ?," etc. For example, in our P-C-R illustration given above, the student, in effect, must decide no more than whether
the principle matches, either because of (A) reliance, or because of (B)
a representation of an existing fact; or whether the principle does not
match because of (C) the absence of a misrepresentation of existing fact,
or because of (D) the buyer's change of mind for justifiable reasons.
The only thing that distinguishes this from a matching question is that
the distractors are reasons rather than other principles.
An attempt to fit a slightly more complex analytical problem into this
framework was of limited success in pretesting. A principle in the CP-R example given above, was the following:
A person is privileged to publish what might otherwise be a defamatory
statement if he communicates information to benefit the person he informs,
as, for example, where a former employer, in response to an inquiry, gives his
reasons to a prospective employer for having discharged an employee.
The above principle is
(A) applicable because Kramer honestly, though erroneously, believed Miss
King to be guilty.
(B) applicable because Kramer hoped to benefit McDonald, a prospective
employer.
(C) inapplicable because Kramer volunteered his opinion to McDonald.
(D) inapplicable because Kramer's grounds for believing Miss King to be
guilty were, at best, insubstantial.
The student here had to do several things. First, he had to isolate
the significant elements of the principle, of the example given with it,
and of the new case. Second, he had to recognize that the example
implied a possible limitation on an issue as to which the principle is silent.
Third, he had to decide whether there is such a degree of importance in
the additional limitation that it should control the broader purport of
the principle.
The principle, of course, relates primarily to the intention of the
person making the statement to benefit the person he tells. Whether the
information is volunteered is hardly determinative of this issue.3 A re8
On the facts,* it is possible that Kramer had no intention to benefit McDonald,
and this may be- a flaw in the question. Hle apparently was sincere, however, In his
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quest for information tends to indicate that a benefit was ifitended, but
the act of volunteering is in no Way inconsistent with such an intention.
Under choice (C), however, the fact alone that the informant is a volunteer would completely override the dominating consideration e pressed
in the principle.
A good student, though, might well have been misled by the applicableinapplicable formula. On all other parts of the test he had been expected to mark "inapplicable" a principle that did not contain elements
that matched all the elements in the case; as we have seen, this is what
"applicable" implies. Here the element of volunteering was present in
the case, referred to in the example, but not referred to in the principle:
thus, it does not "match." A candidate might well have inferred that
he was expected to stop thinking at this point. On the other hand, his
choice would have been clearer had he been instructed to predict the
outcome of the new case in the light of the previously established principle-e. g., "In an action against Kramer for defamation, he should
wir because he hoped to benefit a prospective employer." ' This choice
would be preferable to an alternative such as: "In an action against
Kramer for defamation, he should lose because he volunteered the information."
It is impossible to say, without further testing, just why this question proved harder than most (only eighty-one out of 295 candidates
answered correctly) and why it had a somewhat low correlation with
results on the criterion test. Perhaps Kramer's intention-was too ambiguous; perhaps a change in the applicable-inapplicable language would
present a different result; and it may be that the item failed to correlate more closely because it provides a more rather than a less accurate test of the student's ability. It is worth noting that among the
eighty-one students who correctly chose (B), the mean score was substantially above average, while the 151 who chose (C) had a mean score
just under average. The low correlation factor apparently is clue to the
fact that in the top one-fifth of the group twenty-six chose (B) and
twenty-six chose (C), and in the next one-fifth, eighteen chose (B) and
twenty-nine chose (C). Although a majority of the upper forty 'per
cent went off, it is only in the top fifth that the number of correct answers
even approached the number of incorrect answers. In other words,
only the best students showed a fair degree of success, as 'agroup; with
the more complex analysis. The poorer the group, the lower was the
proportion of correct answers.
belief in the girl's guilt, and this is suggestive of his good faith in informing the
other employer. There was, of course, no choice provided explicitly on grounds of
lack of good faith.

JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION

[VOL. 11

This experiment indicates, at least, that the C-P-R and P-C-R forms
are not necessarily limited t9 testing matching ability alone. Modification of these forms, by elimination of the applicable-inapplicable formula
and otherwise, might well provide tests of deductive facility. This,
however, will only be accomplished by purposeful efforts on the part
of those who prepare the questions and will require more than simply
rephrasing the words "applicable" and "inapplicable." For example, one
P-C-R set has actually been changed in this respect. The result, however, was exactly the same as if, in the P-C-R given above, it read:
"Baracinni will win because . .
." and "Baracinni will lose because . . ."-that
is, the question has remained essentially a test

of a matching.
V
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW QUESTION FORMS

Several new question forms are in early stages of development and experimentation. The problem, as we have seen, is to broaden the analytical scope of the test, without losing the many advantages of the present
forms. Most difficult, perhaps, will be to provide this additional breadth,
without unduly increasing the difficulty of the questions. Because of
the large number and diverse aptitudes of the candidates, a test will not
be suitable if it discriminates closely among the top fraction of the group
but is beyond the comprehension of the remainder. We should also try
to avoid forms that would require long and complex instructions and
that would substantially reduce the number of questions that can be
completed by the candidates in the time available.
A. The Case Method Questions
One obvious line of experimentation is the case method itself. If
a student in law school must be able to read a group of cases, extract
a legal principle, and apply this principle to new situations, a test that
.could duplicate this process may be expected to have significant predictive
value.
We are trying to do this by providing a set of "Decided Cases," each
of which includes a brief statement of facts and a legal result, followed
by several "Problem Cases." Each Problem Case consists of a brief
statement of facts followed by four choices of the proper result. Each
result is stated in the form of a legal principle, and the correct choice is
that principle which is most consistent with the underlying reasoning of
the Decided Cases, taken as a group.
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An illustrative set of Decided Cases is the following:
Pattersonv. Dome: Patterson retired on a piece of land in the country and
underwent considerable expense to landscape it. Not far away Dome owned
an undeveloped field on which thistle-bearing weeds grew in abundance.
In the fall, clouds of thistles blew from Dome's property onto Patterson's,
seeding his lawn and gardens liberally with ugly weeds. Patterson sued
Dome for maintaining a nuisance. Held, Dome is not liable for damages and
cannot be prohibited by injunction from maintaining the weeds on his land.
Peters v. Downing: Downing built a stone wall on his land near to Peters'
boundary line. Over a period of many years, the wall deteriorated, and
large stones from the wall from time to time fell out onto Peters' garden,
killing some plants. Peters sued Downing for maintaining a nuisance. Held,
Peters is entitled to compensation for the plants that were destroyed, and
to an injunction prohibiting Downing from maintaining the wall in such a
way as to cause further injury.
Paul v. Davis: Paul owned a drive-in motibn picture theater near a superhighway. Nearby, Davis operated a dog race track. New floodlights that
were found necessary at the track so illuminated the surrounding area that the
visibility of the picture on Paul's screen was impaired, resulting in a loss
of attendance at the theater. Paul sued Davis for maintaining a nuisance.
Held, Davis is not liable for damages and cannot be prohibited from using
the floodlights.
Parsons, et al. v. Dover: Dover owned a drive-in motion picture theater
in a suburban neighborhood. Parsons and a group of other homeowners
in the vicinity sued Dover for maintaining a nuisance. Held, Parsons and
his neighbors were entitled to an injunction prohibiting Dover from using his
property in such a way as to cause the heavy traffic, noise, and bright lights
that were interfering with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their land.
Pincus Mink, Inc. v. Danton: Danton, in the course of digging an artificial
lake, set off several charges of dynamite. Half a mile away, at a secluded
mink farm, the mother mink were so panicked by the noise and vibrations
that they devoured their young. The mink farm sued Danton for damages
resulting from maintenance of a nuisance. Held, Danton was not liable for
this consequence of his blasting activities.
As he reads these Decided Cases, knowing that he will be required
to answer the Problem Cases in the light of the Decided Cases, the candidate should be assimilating the facts and the results of the Decided
Cases into some sort of coherent system. The extent to which he is
able to accomplish this should be a decisive factor in his performance in
the test.
With varying degrees of success, the candidates will become aware
that there is something called "nuisance" or "maintaining a nuisance";
that one who is affected by a nuisance can, in some, but not all, cases,
obtain relief in the form of an injunction and/or damages; that all the
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cases relate to the use of one piece of land in a manner that interferes
with the use and enjoyment of another piece of land; that thistles blown
from one property to another do not constitute a nuisance, while stones
falling from a wall are a nuisance (because of proximity? because stones
are more dangerous? because one defendant built the wall but the other
did not plant the thistles?) ; that a race track is not a nuisance when it
interferes with a drive-in movie, while a drive-in movie is a nuisance
when it interferes with homelife (because there is something basically
wrong with drive-in movies? because any commercial use is permissible
near a highway, but not all are permissible in a residential area? because
bright lights do not constitute a nuisance, while lights, traffic, and noise
do?); and that when blasting causes mother mink to eat their young,
the blaster is not liable for "this consequence" of his activity (because
of the lack of physical proximity? because the blaster could not have
expected such an odd result?).
These and other conclusions and uncertainties might run through the
mind of the candidate as he reads the cases. The uncertainties need not
be resolved immediately; they might be immaterial to the particular
Problem Cases. But in evolving aLset of propositions such as those out'
lined above, and in reflecting on the possible reasons that underlie them,
the candidate will certainly be doing what we have called induction.
He then will turn to the Problem Cases:
-Problem Case 1: Dooley owns a worthless tract of hilly, rocky land.
At a point overlooking Portnoy's neighboring cottage, soil erosion on Dooley's
,land substantially uncovered and removed the support from under a huge
boulder, which threatens to roll down a steep incline into the cottage... In a
suit by Portnoy against Dooley,
:(A)'Portnoy will be granted an injunction, because a threatened injury to
property or person can be as substantial an interference with land use as an
:actual injury.
-(B) Portnoy will be granted an injunction, because the use to which he is
putting his land is of greater social value.
.(C) Portnoy will be denied an injunction, because the dangerous condition
-has come about without any affirmative act on Dooley's part.
-(D) Portnoy will be denied an injunction, because there has as yet been no
interference with the use and enjoyment of his property.
The correct answer is (C). It harmonizes Patterson v. Dome with
the other cases and is in other respects superior to the alternative choices.
Reason (A), for example, is a logical statement and is supported implicitly by the fact that injunctions have been granted as well as damages, but it does not serve to incorporate the new case into any coherent
Tationalization of the previous cases. If Portnoy wins, why should not
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Patterson have prevailed? It is not enough that the Problem Case and
the Peters case both involved stones: the injury caused by the thistles
was at least as substantial as that caused by the deteriorated wall. Nor is
the fact controlling that in Patterson the pFoperties were not adjacent,
since the plaintiffs in Parsons v. Dover were simply "in the vicinity."
Reason (B), of course, even more clearly fails to square with Patterson v. Done. Reason (D) is simply an inaccurate statement of fact, for
the reason given in (A).
Problem Case 2: Pitt owns a lovely old mansion near Allentown, Pennsylvania. In the course of mining operations at Daisy Mine shaft about a half
mile away, large amounts of coal dust are necessarily sent into the air, endangering the health of Pitt and his family, and coating his house and its contents. In a suit by Pitt against the coal company
(A) Pitt will be granted damages and an injunction, because his injury is
at least as great as that of the plaintiff in Petersv. Downing.
(B) Pitt will be granted an injunction, because his case falls directly under
the decision in Parsons et al. v. Dover.
(C) Pitt will be denied damages and an injunction, because Daisy's mining
activity is a reasonable land use in the community.
(D) Pitt will be denied damages and an injunction, because the distance between his house and the mine is so great that the result could not reasonably
have been foreseen.
This question is a good example of what we are trying to accomplish.
Each of the distractors, or incorrect answers, has some degree of validity on the basis of matching.
In Reason (A), the Problem Case is related to one of the Decided
Cases on the ground of injury, which is by no means an irrelevant factor in granting relief. The candidate should readily realize, however,
that injury is not in itself conclusive, since it was present in the Patterson, Paul,and Pincus cases, in which relief was denied.
Reason (D) refers to the fact that the plaintiff was situated a half
mile from the defendant's activity, which was also true in the Pincus
case. The distance in Pincus, however, was only a minor aspect of
the unforeseeable nature of the injury. Regardless of the distance, the
particular injury in the Problem Case was reasonably foreseeable.
Reason (B) "matches" somewhat better. The Problem Case, in
which a homeowner is suing to prevent a business enterprise from interfering with the use and enjoyment of his residence, is analogized to a
Decided Case involving a similar suit. The candidate will prefer the
correct answer, (C), only if he is able to recognize in the latter the
rationale of the Paul and Parsons cases. It will help if he has sufficient independent judgment to realize, first, that the only land require-
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ment for a drive-in is available space, while coal can be mined only where
coal deposits are; and, second, that coal-mining necessarily affects residential uses in the vicinity.
Perhaps this question goes too far in requiring a "policy" decision
rather than a "logical" answer from the candidate. In spite of the quotation from Justice Cardozo, we have no intention of asking a candidate
to choose among stare decisis, commercial realties, judicial convenience,
and equity between the parties in a case involving the liability of a negligent manufacturer to someone other than the buyer. On the other hand,
it does not seem too much in the above question to expect a candidate to
induce and choose the principle: "Coal mining in Allentown is a reasonable commercial use, and is superior to and cannot be enjoined for the
benefit of neighboring residential use," in preference to the principle: "A
residential owner can enjoin even a reasonable commercial activity that
necessarily interferes with the use and enjoyment of his land."
A related problem arose with regard to Problem Case 1. Originally
Reason (A) read: "Portnoy will be granted an injunction because the
threatened interference with the use and enjoyment of his land is more
substantial than that in Patterson v. Dome." This was considered incorrect because Patterson can only be distinguished by the fact that unimproved land was involved and because the Decided Cases justify no
distinction on the grounds of degree of injury. On reflection, however,
we decided that this distractor would be unfair to a candidate who might
reason as follows: "It is true that Patterson is distinguishable on the
ground that the defendant's land was unimproved. In that case, however, only property damage was involved, and the injury was such that
the plaintiff rather than the defendant might reasonably be called upon
to bear the expense. Here, on the other hand, the threatend injury is
to people as well as property, and, while it appears to be practically impossible for the plaintiff to protect himself, the defendant probably could
remedy the situation with relatively little expense. Reason (A) is,
therefbre, a reasonable result, and is not in conflict with any of the Decided Cases, including Pattersonv. Dome."
This distractor illustrates another problem in preparing questions for
a Law School Admission Test. The candidate who reacts emotionally
rather than rationally to a problem, will probably not obtain top marks
at Law School. It is, therefore, a valid testing device to pose the hard
cases that make bad law. At the same time, however, as the discussion
above indicates, we must be careful in setting up such questions not to
penalize the candidate who is able to justify the emotionally desirable result by displaying more imagination than his examiners.
Problem Case 3: D'Angelo, a retired Army officer, recently installed an
antique cannon on his country estate and has adopted the practice of firing
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it seven times eVery morning, at dawn when he raises the. flag. Paris is a:
neighboring dairy farmer. One of his Guernsey cows has been so startled,
that she has gone dry, and Paris is fearful that the noise will similarly affect.
others of his herd. In a suit by Paris against D'Angelo
(A) Paris will be granted damages and an injunction in accordance with
the reasoning apparently underlying Parsonset al. v. Dover.
(B) Paris will be granted damages and an injunction, because one may'
not make extremely loud noises when injury to others or their property is areasonably foreseeable consequence.
(C) Paris will be denied damages and an injunction in accordance with the'
reasoning apparently underlying PincusMink, Inc. v. Danton.
(D) Paris will be denied damages and an injunction in accordance with the
reasoning apparently underlying Paulv. Davis.
This Problem Case goes one step beyond the prior case in forcing
the candidate to discover and apply the rationale of the Decided Cases,
individually and as a group. Reason (B) should be readily dismissed
as too broad for practical application. Reason (C) is incorrect because
Pincus depended upon the unforeseeable nature of the injury; it would
not be controlling in the Problem Case, at least in so far as an injunction
is concerned, because the effect on the cows is now apparent.
Reason (A) might appear not to "match." In Parsons, the, homeowners were the plaintiffs, not the defendants, and, moreover, the homeowfiers prevailed. Similarly, Reason (D) matches, superficially, because in Paul, a commercial plaintiff was unsuccessful in preventing interference with his business use. The candidate should be able to recognize, however, the importance of -the physical context and social significance of the land uses in each case and to choose (A) as the correct
answer: In the community in question, the plaintiff's particular land
use is entitled to priority over and protection against the harmful effects
of the defendant's less appropriate activity.
B.

The Cumulative Cases Questions

A second experimental question form that can be illustrated at this
stage has been referred to as the Cumulative Cases question. The
candidate is given a number of cases consisting of a set of facts and
a statement as to which party prevailed. Following each case are four
statements of reason, in the form of suggested legal principles, purporting to explain or justify the given result, The candidate must choose
the principle that best expresses the rational foundation of the given
result, giving preference to the narrowest statement of principle that
reasonably explains the result. The cases are cumulative in the sense
that each principle chosen must not only rationalize the case it accompanies, but also be consistent with any prior cases in the same set-that
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is, the pri'nciple chosen for Case 2 must be consistent with the result in
Case 1 as -well as Case 2; the principle chosen for Case 3 must be consistent'with the results in Cases 1 and 2 as well as 3; etc.
The theoretical value of such a question form is that it tests the can-'
didate's ability to develop a consistent series of legal principles from an
expanding set of interrelated cases. Just as in many casebooks, each
additional case requires the deduction that a previous principle is controlling, with or without reinement or expansion, or the induction of
an entirely new principle. .In addition, certain practical advantages over
the Case Method form derive from the fact that in the Cumulative Cases
questi.ons, every case provides a question; whereas in the Case Method
form, at least two or three cases are required to produce one question.
The Cumulative Cases will, therefore, be easier for the examiners to
preliard 9 and cn be answered with greater economy of time. On the
other hand, an entire' Cumulatiye Cases set may be affected if a single
item is ufisuccessful in pretesting and has to be removed.
The following set of questions is adopted from the first chapter of
cases in A. James Casner and W. Barton Leach's Cases & Text on Property (1950).
Case.-1: Pierson was fox hunting.for pleasure. His dogs trailed a fox for
several miles and Pierson shot it, wounding it severely. As the, 'fox was
limping along, about to collapse, with Pierson and his dogs almost upon it,
Post, a furrier, easily seized the fox and carried it off. In an action by Pierson against Post for recovery of the fox's pelt, held, for Post.
The narrowest principle that reasonably explains this result is:
(A) One who hunts for a livelihood has superior rights to one who hunts for
pleasure.
(B) Possession is nine-tenths of the law.
(C) A wild animal belongs to the first person who captures it.
(D) The pelt of a*wild animal belongs to whoever owns the animal at the
time it dies.
The candidate might recognize first that Answer' (A) is not inconsistent with the case, but he should also immediately observe that the
statement is unduly broad. Standing alone, this principle would justify
a judgment for Post even if he had wrested the dead carcass from Pierson's arms as the latter. carried it triumphantly homeward. This choice
can be correct only if there is no more narrow or more reasonable principle that is consistent with the result.
9 Because the legal principles build on each other In both of the new forms, those
who prepare the questions should be able to draw from more areas of law than
is possible with the current forms.
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Answer (B) is gibberish, unless it is intended to refer to the practikal
disadvantages of being a plaintiff and carrying the burden of institutingsuit and the burden of proof. Since these practical problems are not.
indicated in this case, this answer should be readily discarded.
Answer (D) is incorrect because the statement assumes that Postowned the animal when it died-the very question in issue-but does not
state why he owned it.
Answer (C), the correct choice, reasonably explains the result and is
considerably less broad than Answer (A).
Case 2: Keeble, a poultry dealer, owned a pond to which he attracted ducks
by means of wooden decoys and artificial duck calls. He then would capture
the ducks by netting them. Hickeringill, a neighbor who held a grudge
against Keeble, began to frighten off the sitting ducks by firing a gun at
them from neighboring property. In an action by Keeble against Hickeringill
for loss of profits due to Hickeringill's actions, held, for Keeble.
The narrowest principle that reasonably explains this result, and is
consistent with the preceding case, is:
(A) A wild animal belongs to the first person who captures' it.
(B) One who maliciously interferes with another's business mist pay damages for loss of profits.
(C) A wild animal belongs to thi" first person who employs all commercially
reasonable means to capture it.
(D) One who once has a wild animal on his property is entitled to ownership
of the animal thereafter.
Answer (A), although correct in Case 1, is inadequate here because
neither party has captured the ducks.
Answer (C), although a reasonable refinement of the previous correct
principle, is incorrect because when Hickeringill frightened the ducks,
Keeble had not yet employed all reasonable means of capturing them.
Answer (D), although consistent with the result, -is unreasonably
broad.
"
"Answvr (B) i "correct.
Case 3: Mullett was engaged in the business of capturing sea lions and disposing bf them to persons interested in exhibiting them. One of the animals
was kept by Mullett at Glen Island, on Long Island sound, -but one day escaped... Mullett.made no effoxt .to-reicapture the sea lion', btit:a few weeks
later discovered that it had been found by a fisherman named Bradley, who
was exhibiting it on Nantucket. In an action by Mullett against BradIgy
.
for the! return of the sea lion or its'fair value, held, for Bradley..
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The narrowest principle that reasonably explains this result, and is
consistent with the preceding cases, is:
(A) As between two parties who fish or hunt for a living, possession is ninetenths of the law.
(B) The most recent owner of a wild animal need not return it to a former
owner.
(C) Since Bradley was a fisherman himself, he did not act maliciously in
capturing Mullett's sea lion. .
(D) A wild animal that is free of artificial restraint belongs to the first person
who captures it.
Answer (A) is incorrect here for the reasons stated above.
Answer (B) is incorrect because, as in Case 1 (D), the answer is assumed rather than explained.
Answer (C) is correct only in a negative sense. It is typical of many
correct answers we have used under the applicable-inapplicable formula
of the C-P-R, P-C-R forms. That is, it involves the selection of a
"matching" element within the problem, but does not really express the
rationale of the case.
Answer (D) does provide the rationale of this case. It is, in addition, a refinement of the correct principle in Case 1 because it holds, in
effect, that to capture a wild animal confers ownership only so long as
the animal is not permitted to escape artificial restraint. The candidate
who reads hastily or without perception, however, may fail to recognize
the importance of escape, and incorrectly think of Mullett as remaining
"the first person" to capture the animal.
Case 4: One day a very large school of mackerel came into the Bay of St.
Ives. Young's boat put out and shot her sean. The sean was then drawn
in a semicircle around the school, encircling the fish completely except for a
space of about ten fathoms, in which Young's men were splashing their oars
to frighten the mackerel from escaping through the opening. However, before Young could draw his net closer, Hickens' boat rowed through the
-opening, shot her sean, enclosed the fish, and captured all of them.. In an ac.tion by Young against Hickens for loss of profits, held, for Hickens,
The narrowest principle that reasonable explains' this result, and is
,consistent with the preceding cases, is:
(A) The decision in Keeble v. Hickeringill is inapplicable because the fish
were still in the sea, and not on the plaintiff's property.
(B) The rule of Mullett v. Bradley is not satisfied by anything less than
complete possession and control.
(C) The decision in Keeble v. Hickeringill is inapplicable when both parties
are commercial fishermen.

19581

TESTING ANALYTIC ABimTy

(D) As between two parties who fish for a living, the one who carries the
fish to shore will prevail.
Answer (A) should appeal only to those candidates who incorrectly
chose (D) in Case 2, or who were uncertain enough in rejecting. 2(D)
to be confused by this reference back to it. This point raises a question
that is not always easy to resolve. Is it fair to put a candidate in the
position of compounding an initial error and thereby losing twice for
the same mistake? In the present context, at least, it does seem fair.
Among the candidates who went wrong the first time, there should be
some who will realize the error on reviewing the issue. On the other
hand, if there are any who answered correctly the first time, but who
would be confused by the reference back to an incorrect answer, it would
seem better to have them miss two out of two than hit one out of one. In
addition, two other choices in this question also refer back specifically to
a previous case. The total effect, therefore, should be to compel the
candidate to reassess generally his previous answers and to make certain
that his answer in this case harmonizes with them.
(B), the correct answer, states the necessary corollary of the Mullett
rule, which is in fact implicit in Pierson v. Post.
Answer (C), like 3(C) supra, is accurate only in that it states why
the plaintiff did not prevail; it does not tell us why the defendant won.
Answer (D), which would condone piracy, is too broad.
Case 5: Hough set a lobster trap, attaching a float identifying the trap as
his own. The lobsters in the trap could escape only through a small opening
at the top of the trap when the water became disturbed by wind and storm.
just prior to the normal time for pulling the trap, Shaw took out a boat,
hauled in the trap, and sold the lobsters. In an action by Hough against
Shaw for the market price of the lobsters, held, for Hough.
The narrowest principle that reasonably explains this result, and is
consistent with the preceding eases, is:
(A) A fish or animal in its natural state belongs to the first person to enclose it, subject to capture at his pleasure.
(B) One who steals the property of another is liable to civil damages as well
as criminal penalties.
(C) One who fakes advantage of another's labor will not be permitted to
profit thereby.
(D) A fish or animal in its natural state belongs to the first person who employs all commercially reasonable means to capture it.
Answer (A) would be an extremely close choice with the correct
answer, (D), if it were not for the preceding case. What distinguishes
this case is that the use of lobster traps would be commercially imprac-
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tical if a contrary result were reached. The fact that the actual result
in Case 4 may also be commercially and socially undesirable is immaterial. The facts in the present case are different enough in degree to
support the principle. The candidate must realize, too, that commercial
necessity also has resulted in a refinement of the Pierson-A'lllettrule.
Answer (B) is a variation of 1 (D) and 3(B), which also begged the
question.
. Answer (C) would also be a close choice, were it not for Pierson v.
Post and Young v. Hickens. ispecially in the former, the unsuccessful
plaintiff had provided most of the effort. Shaw, in the present case, may
well have expended as much or more labor than Hough.
VI
CONCLUSION

.Although the Law School Admission Test provides a significant forecast of performance at law school, we are attempting to improve it by
introducing a broader test of the candidate's analytic ability. The scope
of the current question forms has been restricted primarily to the selection
and matching of the significant elements in a stated case with the significant elements in a stated principle. Law school teaching methods
indicate, however, that a student's success will depend to a great extent on his ability to induce the rationale of a case or cases and to deduce the proper result in a new case by applying the rationale. Rather
than asking whether specific facts are present, therefore, we want to
ask which party would prevail, and for what underlying reason. In so
far as we are successful in preparing such questions, we have reason to
hope for a significantly higher correlation between performance on the
Law School Admission Test and subsequent performance in law school.

